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CASENOTES
STATE v. FISHER: CANINE SNIFFS -
WHO LET THE DOGS OUT?
SHANNON R. HURLEY-DEAL*
INTRODUCTION
Canines were first used by law enforcement in 1899 in the City of
Ghent, Belgium.' However, it was not until 1957, after failed attempts
to implement police dogs in the early 1950s, that an organized canine
unit was operated successfully in the United States.2 In North Caro-
lina, the State Highway Patrol has operated a canine narcotics sniff
team since August 1988. 3 With the advent and increase in the use of
canines in police work, the issues surrounding search and seizure have
been visited frequently by North Carolina courts, and by the Supreme
Court of the United States, in an effort of define the boundaries of the
canine sniff.
In State v. Fisher, law enforcement officers stopped Felix Fisher for
driving with a revoked license.4 Because the officers had knowledge
of his prior involvement with drugs, they conducted a canine sniff of
his vehicle and discovered marijuana.5 Fisher was arrested on the
drug charges, but not cited for the traffic violation.6 The North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals held that the canine sniff and subsequent search
both were conducted without justifiable reasonable suspicion and
were outside the scope of the initial stop.7 While the court held a
canine sniff is not a search, they also imposed a more restrictive
boundary on the use of canine sniffs and searches at investigatory traf-
fic stops.
* Shannon R. Hurley-Deal is a 4LE at the North Carolina Central University School of
Law, JD candidate, May 2004. She thanks her family for patience, support, and encouragement.
1. History of the Police Dog Service, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, at http://www.rcmp.
ca/pds/dog/srvce-hstry/servhstryO4_e.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
2. Id.
3. North Carolina State Highway Patrol Canine Unit, North Carolina State Highway Patrol,
at http://www.ncshp.orgfk-91.html (last visited Jun. 8, 2002) (printout on file with author).
4. State v. Fisher, 539 S.E.2d 677 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000), appeal dismissed ex mero motu, 547
S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 2001).
5. Id. at 680.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 685.
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Fisher followed the
United States Supreme Court declaration in City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond 8 and held that a canine sniff of a vehicle's perimeter is not a
search.9 Before the Fisher and Edmond decisions, North Carolina
courts had held that a canine sniff of a vehicle perimeter likely was not
a search.1" While the North Carolina position on the status of a ca-
nine sniff remains consistent with current Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, North Carolina courts have gone beyond the Supreme Court
position and have taken a more restrictive stance in requiring justifica-
tion to "let the dogs out." In Fisher, the lack of a search incident to
arrest and the presence of a reasonable suspicion based on objective
facts are retained as key elements in determining whether a canine
sniff is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'1 These elements
must be met despite the finding that a canine sniff is not a true search.
North Carolina courts should continue to follow the reasoning of
Fisher. The decision affords proper protection of citizens against un-
reasonable search and seizure as provided by the Fourth Amendment.
It also provides a clear standard for the use of canine sniffs and subse-
quent searches of vehicles. Not only does the standard ensure protec-
tion of those stopped by law enforcement officers, it also bolsters the
potential for evidence to be obtained appropriately, and thus not be
suppressed by the courts.
This note will first examine the Fisher case - its facts and rationale.
Next, it will discuss the status of Supreme Court jurisprudence and
North Carolina law regarding canine sniffs at motor vehicle investiga-
tory stops. Further, this note will shed light on the differences be-
tween the broader federal standard for canine sniffs, as compared to
the more restrictive North Carolina position. Finally, this note will
discuss the significance of Fisher and the possible implications of the
decision on citizens and practitioners.
THE CASE
On December 1, 1998, Felix Fisher was stopped by a New Bern po-
lice officer for operating his vehicle with a revoked driver's license.12
A New Bern police investigator, Investigator Smith, spotted Fisher's
8. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
9. Fisher, 539 S.E.2d at 677.
10. See State v. Falana, 501 S.E.2d 358 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); State v. McClendon, 502
S.E.2d 902 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, house,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
12. Fisher, 539 S.E.2d at 679.
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parked vehicle in an area known for its drug trade. Knowing Fisher's
reputation for dealing drugs, Investigator Smith ran a record check on
Fisher's license plate and found that his license was revoked. How-
ever Investigator Smith did not question, or arrest Fisher at that
time.'3 When Fisher was spotted on the evening of December 1, 1998,
Investigator Smith requested that Fisher be stopped. The officer that
stopped Fisher conducted the stop along with Investigator Smith. 4
Upon request of the investigator, Fisher displayed a limited driving
privilege license that allowed him to drive his vehicle until 8:00pm -
the traffic stop occurred at 8:20pm. 15 Fisher exited his vehicle as in-
structed and the investigator directed the officer to cite Fisher for
driving while his license was revoked. Fisher was then placed under
arrest for the violation. t6 Evidence at trial indicated Fisher was coop-
erative and compliant with the officer and investigator. He exhibited
no violent behavior, and he did not attempt to retrieve any firearm or
other deadly weapon from his person. 7 The law enforcement officers
at the scene did not observe any openly exposed contraband, weap-
ons, or other items that would have indicated the existence of any
violation other than driving with a revoked license.18 Notwithstanding
these circumstances, Investigator Smith radioed a request for a canine
unit trained in the detection of drugs. When canine "Kiko" arrived,
the dog sniffed Fisher's vehicle and "alerted" at the front of the vehi-
cle. 9 "Without obtaining Fisher's consent or informing him of their
intent to search the [vehicle], the officers searched under the hood,
where they located 135 grams of marijuana inside the vehicle's
firewall."20
Fisher was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to sell
and deliver, maintaining a vehicle for the purpose of keeping con-
trolled substances, and possession of drug paraphernalia. 2 He was
transported to the magistrate's office where his bond was set on the
drug charges and he was released.22 However, contrary to statutory
procedure, Fisher's citation for driving with revoked license was never
signed by the magistrate.23 Furthermore, the time listed on the cita-
13. Id. at 683.









23. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-511(c) (2001) ("If the person has been arrested, for a crime,
without a warrant: (1) The magistrate must determine whether there is probable cause to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested committed it, and in the manner
20031
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tion for driving with a revoked license was 24 minutes after the time
the marijuana was seized.2 a
At trial, Judge Everett of the Craven County Superior Court
granted Fisher's motion to suppress the evidence of the marijuana
found in Fisher's vehicle. The trial court found the search of Fisher's
vehicle was performed without his consent and without probable
cause. 2 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
order to suppress the evidence, but disagreed with the trial court's
determination that Fisher was arrested on the evening in question.26
The court held while the officers had reasonable cause to stop Fisher
and probable cause to arrest him for driving with a revoked license,
the officers had no justified and reasonable cause to conduct a canine
sniff of Fisher's vehicle and to follow up with a search.27 The Court of
Appeals also found there was no evidence to indicate that Fisher was
arrested. The officer's failure to obtain a magistrate's signature on the
driving with a revoked license citation,2 8 and failure to set Fisher's
bond, indicated that Fisher was never arrested.2 9 Also, the perform-
ance of a canine sniff, search, and seizure prior to the issuance of the
traffic citation indicated, according to the court, activities conducted
outside the scope of the stop.3" The State contended that even if
Fisher was not arrested, justification was not necessary to conduct the
canine sniff of Fisher's vehicle. The Court of Appeals disagreed with
this argument and affirmed the order to suppress the evidence, hold-
ing that a justified reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is required
to conduct the canine sniff.31
The North Carolina Attorney General filed a notice of appeal to
the North Carolina Supreme Court based on a substantial constitu-
tional question and filed a petition for discretionary review of the
Court of Appeals decision.32 The notice of appeal was dismissed ex
mero motu and the petition for discretionary review was denied.33
provided by G.S. 15A-304(d). (2) If the magistrate determines that there is no probable cause
the person must be released. (3) If the magistrate determines that there is probable cause, he
must issue a magistrate's order... .
24. Fisher, 539 S.E.2d at 681.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 685.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-511(e) (2001) ("If the person arrested is not released pursu-
ant to subsection (c), the magistrate must release him in accordance with Article 26 of this Chap-
ter, bail, or commit him to an appropriate detention facility pursuant to G.S. 15A-521 pending
further proceedings in the case.").
30. Fisher, 539 S.E.2d at 685.
31. Id. at 683.
32. State v. Fisher, 547 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 2001).
33. Id.
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BACKGROUND
The United States Customs Service first used dogs to detect drugs in
1970."4 Since that time, drug dogs have become a commonly used law
enforcement tool. In 2002, the United States Custom's Canine En-
forcement Program recorded 4,980 arrests resulting from canine en-
forcement activity.35 The usefulness of canine sniffs results from dogs'
very powerful olfactory sense. If laid out, the surface area of a dog's
olfactory cells would cover a space equivalent to the skin area of the
dog's body.36 In comparison, the surface area of human olfactory cells
would cover no more than a postage stamp.37
The most recent United States Supreme Court case regarding the
canine sniff of a vehicle is City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.8 In Ed-
mond, the Court declared that a canine sniff of the exterior of a car is
not a search.39 The Edmond Court relied on its holding in United
States v. Place as the basis for maintaining this position."n In Place,
the Court held that a "sniff-test" by a trained drug detection dog does
not violate the Fourth Amendment.41 While the facts of the case in-
volved a canine sniff and subsequent seizure of an airplane passen-
ger's luggage, the Court broadly construed canine searches. The Court
held the information obtained by a canine sniff is limited and thus sui
generis.n This unique nature of the canine search, according to the
Court, results in such a limited investigation so as not to violate the
Fourth Amendment.43 The Court further reasoned that "[t]he Fourth
Amendment 'protects people from unreasonable government intru-
sions into their legitimate expectations of privacy"'," and the canine
sniff of luggage does not require opening luggage or other intrusive
measures. Therefore, according to the Court, sniffing involves no in-
trusion on a legitimate expectation of privacy. In Edmond, the Court
likened the lack of need to enter a person's vehicle when performing a
34. Craig Scheiner, Time Is Of the Es'Scents: The Fourth Amendment, Canine Olfaction, and
Vehicle Stops, 76 FLA. B.J. 26 (2002).
35. Canine Enforcement Program, United States Customs and Border Protection, at http://
www.cbp.govlxp/cgov/enforcement/canines/canine-program/canine.xml (last visited Nov. 1,
2003).
36. Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the Narcotics Detec-
tion Dog, 85 Ky. L.J. 405, 408 (Winter 1996/1997).
37. Id.
38. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32.
39. Id. at 40 ("an exterior of an automobile does not require entry into the car and is not
designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics ... a sniff
by a dog that simply walks around a car us is 'much less intrusive than a typical search'.").
40. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
41. Id. at 707.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 706 (quoting United States v. Chadwick. 433 U.S. 1, 7).
2003]
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canine sniff to the non-intrusive "check" of an airplane passenger's
luggage.45 Under the Supreme Court analysis, justified reasonable-
ness of the canine sniff is not considered because that element is con-
fined to analysis of a search only.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Fisher adopted the Su-
preme Court holding in Edmond that a canine sniff is not a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes. Prior to Fisher, North Carolina courts
had held the canine sniff likely was not a search but had not estab-
lished a definitive position.46 With this adoption, the North Carolina
courts now follow almost every other court in the United States.
However, somewhat uniquely, the court in Fisher took the additional
step of requiring reasonable suspicion based on objective facts to per-
form the canine sniff.47 This holding, despite its uniqueness among
other state positions,48 is consistent with prior holdings from the
North Carolina courts. For example, in State v. Falana the Court of
Appeals indicated that while a canine sniff was not a search, an of-
ficer's suspicions must reach the level of a "reasonable and articulable
suspicion that criminal activity [is] afoot."49 In Falana, a North Caro-
lina Highway Patrol officer stopped a driver after observing the car
weave within its own lane.5" After asking several questions and run-
ning several records checks, the officer wrote the defendant a warning
ticket. As the defendant was walking back to his vehicle, the officer
believed the defendant was nervous and thus asked to search his vehi-
cle. When the defendant refused, the officer performed a canine sniff
of the vehicle's exterior.51 Cocaine was located in the vehicle and the
defendant was placed under arrest.52 The Court of Appeals held de-
tention of the defendant in order to conduct a canine sniff must be
justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court fur-
45. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40.
46. Fisher, 539 S.E.2d at 683.
47. Id. at 677.
48. See Cresswell v. Florida, 564 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1990) (holding canine sniff valid and not a
search when conducted 20 minutes after initial stop); State v. Hill, 770 So. 2d 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding canine sniff valid when conducted without relation to initial purpose of
stop); Denton v. Florida, 524 So. 2d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding canine sniff valid and
not a search when conducted 45 minutes after initial stop); O'Keefe v. Georgia, 376 S.E.2d 406
(Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (holding a canine sniff is not a search); State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762
(Tenn. 2000) (holding a canine sniff does not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy and is
not a search).
49. State v. Falana, 501 S.E.2d 358, 360 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Pearson, 498
S.E.2d 599, 600 (N.C. 1998)).
50. Id. at 358.
51. Id. at 359.
52. Id.
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ther concluded the officer's suspicions were not sufficient for further
detention.53
Conversely, the Court of Appeals in State v. McClendon held that a
vehicle stop, external sniff, and subsequent seizure of marijuana were
supported by reasonable suspicion, and thus valid.54 In McClendon,
two vans that appeared to be traveling together were stopped by the
North Carolina Highway Patrol for speeding.55 One of the van drivers
appeared very nervous and gave conflicting information regarding the
owner of the van and his trip itinerary. After the driver refused to
consent to search, the officer performed a canine sniff of the van's
exterior. 56 The canine "alerted", and more than fifty pounds, but less
than one hundred pounds, of marijuana was seized from the van.57
The Court of Appeals found the officer had probable cause to stop the
vehicle, the officer's investigation of the defendant was reasonably re-
lated to the issuance of the warning ticket, and the conflicting state-
ments of the defendant provided something more than an
"unparticularlized suspicion or hunch."58 While producing a different
result than Falana, the McClendon court's reasoning remained consis-
tent between the two decisions. Both Falana and McClendon rein-
force the necessity for justified reasonable suspicion in order to
conduct a canine sniff.
Another important issue discussed in Fisher was the failure of law
enforcement to arrest the defendant.59 The trial court had found that
Fisher was arrested for driving with a revoked license. However, the
Court of Appeals ruled that this finding was not supported by compe-
tent evidence. 6' Therefore, even if the sniff and subsequent search
had been based on reasonable suspicion, the reasonable suspicion was
not incident to a lawful arrest.
A search must be supported by probable cause unless it meets cer-
tain exceptions set out in United States v. Robinson.61 Warrantless
searches and seizures violate the Fourth Amendment unless the
search meets one of several exceptions.6" One of these exceptions is a
53. Id. at 360. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding once the original
grounds of the vehicle stop have been addressed, there must be a reasonable and articulable
suspicion in order to justify further delay).
54. State v. McClendon, 502 S.E.2d 902 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
55. Id. at 903.
56. Id. at 904.
57. Id. at 903.
58. Id. at 908. See also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding the only re-
quirement for the detention during an investigatory stop is a minimum level of objective
justification).
59. Fisher, 539 S.E.2d at 682.
60. Id.
61. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
62. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
2003]
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search incident to an arrest. The Court in Robinson provided two fac-
tors for determining the appropriateness of a search incident to arrest:
(1) the need to disarm the suspect to take him into custody, and (2)
the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. 63 However, in
Knowles v. Iowa', a unanimous Supreme Court held that a search
incident to a relatively minor traffic violation was not in keeping with
the Fourth Amendment, and thus refused to apply the Robinson
"search incident to arrest" criteria as a bright-line rule. In a minor
traffic violation scenario, the concern for officer safety and the con-
cern for loss or destruction of evidence are minimal. The Knowles
decision was critical to the holding in Fisher because Fisher was never
arrested for his traffic violation, thus making the search of his vehicle
unjustified as a search incident to a lawful arrest.66 According to the
Court of Appeals, the trial court erred in applying the Robinson stan-
dard,67 instead of the more appropriate Knowles standard.68 The
court in Fisher went further to declare that while the canine sniff was
not a search, it was still beyond the scope of the initial stop for a traf-
fic violation.69
ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search
and seizure is often quoted as one of the most sacred liberties in the
United States. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, with the hold-
ing in Fisher, leads the vanguard in protecting this right. Currently,
most states follow the Supreme Court jurisprudence of Place7" and
Edmond,7" holding that a canine sniff is not a search.72 In fact, the
premise is almost universal in the United States. However, courts in
this country differ regarding the application of reasonable suspicion as
a requirement for a canine sniff. States may interpret their own con-
stitutions uniquely and thereby expand the liberties afforded by the
Fourth Amendment.73 The North Carolina Constitution74 , as well as
63. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
64. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
65. Id. at 119.
66. Fisher, 539 S.E.2d at 682.
67. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
68. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 119.
69. Fisher, 539 S.E.2d at 685.
70. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
71. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40.
72. See State v. Hill, 770 So. 2d 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding canine sniff valid
when conducted without relation to initial purpose of stop); O'Keefe v. Georgia, 376 S.E.2d 406
(Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (holding a canine sniff is not a search); State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762
(Tenn. 2000) (holding a canine sniff does not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy and is
not a search).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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the Fourth Amendment, protects against unsupported search and
seizure. North Carolina is one of a few states75 that impose the addi-
tional requirement of justified reasonable suspicion for a canine sniff
of a motor vehicle, despite the fact that the sniff is not a search. As a
variation on the North Carolina interpretation, Florida courts do not
require reasonable suspicion, but do impose a reasonable time limit
requirement on the accomplishment of the sniff.
76
The position asserted in Fisher certainly places the North Carolina
courts in a more protective position than called for by the Supreme
Court.77 However, Fisher is consistent with previous holdings of the
North Carolina Court of Appeals in Falana78 and McClendon.79 This
consistency demonstrates an element of reliability within the North
Carolina courts to apply search and seizure analysis more stringently,
and thus provides practitioners with a stable foundation upon which
to argue. The Fisher holding relates logically to the prior case law,
with no great "leaps of logic" required to arrive at the decision. Such
exacting reasoning benefits practitioners as they formulate arguments
on either side of the canine sniff issue.
In fact, Fisher may be construed as "defendant-friendly" with re-
gard to cases of law enforcement intervention. By requiring a law en-
forcement officer to justify a canine sniff with reasonable suspicion, a
defendant may be afforded greater protection from intrusion during a
traffic stop. Otherwise, without a warrant, probable cause or reasona-
ble suspicion, the ability of law enforcement to "sniff and search" a
motorist's vehicle approaches violation of the Fourth Amendment.
By retaining the boundary of reasonable suspicion around the canine
sniff, judicial scrutiny of the process is also retained. Without such a
74. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20 ("General warrants, whereby any officer or other person may
be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of the act committed, or to seize any
person or persons not named, whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evi-
dence, are dangerous to liberty and shall not be granted"). See also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
75. See State v. Miller, 647 N.W.2d 348 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (Dykman, J., concurring) (en-
couraging use of justified reasonable suspicion for conducting canine sniffs). See also Pooley v.
Alaska, 705 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1985) (holding a canine sniff is a search); State v. Pellicci, 580
A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990) (holding state constitution more restrictive than federal constitution and
requiring probable cause to conduct canine search); People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990) (holding reasonable suspicion required before conducting canine sniff of private
residence); Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1993) (holding police must have proba-
ble cause to believe that a canine search of a person will produce evidence of a crime).
76. E.g., Denton v. Florida, 524 So. 2d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding canine sniff
valid and not a search when conducted 45 minutes after initial stop); Cresswell v. Florida, 564 So.
2d 480 (Fla. 1990) (canine sniff valid and not a search when conducted 20 minutes after initial
stop).
77. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696 (1983).
78. Falana, 501 S.E.2d 358.
79. McClendon, 502 S.E.2d 902.
2003]
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boundary, sniffs would simply be labeled as "not a search", resulting
in potential unchecked abuse of discretion by law enforcement. Some
may argue the standard makes law enforcement, particularly drug ar-
rests, more difficult. However, some scholars have proposed that in-
stead of hindering law enforcement, such standards eliminate
ambiguity in the process, and thereby lessen the likelihood of suppres-
sion of evidence.8" With a clear delineation of when it is appropriate
to employ canine sniffs, evidence obtained via the method will have a
greater likelihood of being admitted at trial. This could make the use
of law enforcement more effective, and promote greater efficiency in
the court system. These are very desirable outcomes for the legal
system.
Alternatively, advocates may be able to attack the status of North
Carolina law based on its minority view of canine sniffs. Because
many states81 do not follow the requirement of justified reasonable
cause for a canine sniff, it may be argued that the position is truly not
in keeping with Supreme Court jurisprudence and is inappropriate.
While this argument may find support in several other states' posi-
tions, it appears North Carolina's stance has remained consistent and
such an attempt to distinguish would be ineffective.82 Not only is the
Fisher holding in keeping with North Carolina case law, it is also con-
sistent with the North Carolina Constitution.83
The Fisher decision leaves few issues particular to North Carolina
jurisprudence unanswered. However, Fisher and its Supreme Court
counterparts have left some bigger questions open for clarification.
Some authorities argue that the holding in Place that canine sniffs are
not searches may be contradicted by a more recent decision in Kyllo v.
United States. 84
80. Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to
Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 381, 437 (2001).
81. See Cresswell v. Florida, 564 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1990) (holding canine sniff valid and not a
search when conducted 20 minutes after initial stop); State v. Hill, 770 So. 2d 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding canine sniff valid when conducted without relation to initial purpose of
stop); Denton v. Florida, 524 So. 2d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding canine sniff valid and
not a search when conducted 45 minutes after initial stop); O'Keefe v. Georgia, 376 S.E.2d 406
(Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (holding a canine sniff is not a search); State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762
(Tenn. 2000) (holding a canine sniff does not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy and is
not a search).
82. See Falana, 501 S.E.2d 358 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); McClendon, 502 S.E.2d 902 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1998).
83. See N.C. CONsT. art. I. § 20.
84. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also State v.
Haley, 41 P.3d 666, 671 n.2 (Colo. 2001) ("the logic of this holding undercuts the prosecution's
argument that dog sniffs of the outside of an automobile to detect the contents thereof do not
fall within a reasonable expectation of privacy"); State v. Miller, 647 N.W.2d 348, 355 n.9 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2002) (Dykman, J., concurring) ("some courts have concluded that Kyllo undermines
the logic behind a conclusion that dog sniffs are not searches.").
10
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In Kyllo, law enforcement officers were suspicious that marijuana
was being grown in Kyllo's home. Prior to obtaining a warrant, the
police used a thermal imager to scan Kyllo's home. Based on evi-
dence gathered by the thermal imager, the police then obtained a war-
rant to search Kyllo's residence. Both the Federal District Court in
Oregon and the Ninth Circuit held the scan was not a search and did
not impinge on the Fourth Amendment." Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority in Kyllo, held surveillance of homes conducted with
"sense-enhancing technology" does constitute a search.86 The Court
in Kyllo defined "sense-enhancing technology" as obtaining informa-
tion that "could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area."87 The Court further
reasoned that use of such technology violated the Fourth Amend-
ment. Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, proposed the decision
could include canine sniffs, thereby classifying them as searches.8
Justice Stevens perceived such a holding as contrary to the Court's
holding in Place. It may be argued that in light of the decision in
Kyllo, a canine sniff should be considered a search. In fact, this has
been proposed in the years since Place8 9 as well as in the wake of
Kyllo.9 0 As previously discussed, the canine's sense of smell is much
more powerful than the human sense. It seems quite possible to inter-
pret the canine sense of smell as covered by the Court's definition of
sense-enhancing technology, despite the Court's implied attempt to
limit the holding to a search of a private residence. However, for Jus-
tice Stevens, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, the connection between sniff or search of a private residence
and a vehicle is easily made. While the Supreme Court has yet to
reconcile Kyllo and Place, and North Carolina courts have not sup-
ported such interpretation, the discrepancy provides perspective for
practitioners on the range of interpretation and argument - particu-
larly in light of growing numbers of electronic "sniffers" such as ther-
mal scans and other surveillance technologies.
As a final wrinkle in the canine sniff issue, canine sniff reliability
remains untouched by North Carolina courts and by the Supreme
Court. According to some scholars, a growing number of judges are
affirming canine sniff seizures only upon a finding of the particular
85. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
86. Id. at 40.
87. Id. at 35.
88. Id. at 47.
89. Place, 462 U.S. 696; See also Hope Walker Hall, Sniffing Out the Fourth Amendment:
United States v. Place - Dog Sniffs - Ten Years Later, 46 ME. L. REV. 151 (1994).
90. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (holding that the majority decision can
be construed to classify canine sniffs as searches).
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dog's reliability. 91 Some courts have been unwilling to affirm reliabil-
ity without appropriate supporting evidence such as training or back-
ground.92 Other decisions advocate the need for testimony from
individuals familiar with the dog. Some look to the dog's performance
in practice, and observe that a dog alert may not provide probable
cause if that dog has a poor accuracy record.93 One commentator has
suggested particular elements that the magistrate should look for
when issuing a warrant including the selection and training standard
for the canine, and the number of false negatives reported by the ca-
nine.94 The implication of this proposition for North Carolina practi-
tioners could be an additional argument against admissibility of canine
sniff evidence. Even when there is reasonable suspicion that warrants
a canine sniff, the potential for unreliable "alerts" may leave some
citizens at risk for needless search.
CONCLUSION
The protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment are a founda-
tion for the privacy rights enjoyed by citizens of the United States. In
fact, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in Arizona v. Hicks, "there is
nothing new in the realization that the Court sometimes insulates the
criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all."95 By
retaining the level of scrutiny afforded by North Carolina courts
under Fisher, citizens are sheltered from unwarranted intrusions dur-
ing traffic stops, and closely valued privacy remains protected. The
Fisher court provides that an officer must have a reasonable suspicion
based on material facts in order to conduct a canine sniff, and that
suspicion must be within the scope of the initial stop.96 While canine
sniffs play an integral part in the seizure of illegal drugs and in the
protection of the public, North Carolina should maintain its protective
position on behalf of its citizens and set an example of privacy protec-
tion for other states to follow.
91. See Logan, supra note 80.
92. Id. at 418.
93. Id. at 419.
94. Id.
95. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987).
96. Fisher, 539 S.E.2d at 685.
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